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The majority of those living in the border region of Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda are pastoralists, whose livelihoods are dictated by the upkeep and size of 
their herds. Harsh environmental conditions force pastoralists to migrate in search of water and pasturelands during the dry season. With limited access to 
water and competing rights to land, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from one tribe enter the territory of another. The increased availability of 
small arms in the region from past wars increasingly makes ordinary clashes fatal. Governments in the region have responded with heavy-handed coercive 
disarmament operations. These have led to distrust and subsequent violent clashes between communities and security providers. This report reviews the 
scale, consequences of, and responses to the many pastoral conflicts, utilizing methodological tools such as key informant interviews, retrospective analy-
sis, and a thorough review of available literature.
Pastoralists at War:  
Violence and Security in the  
Kenya-Sudan-Uganda Border Region
Jonah Leff, Monterey Institute of International Studies, United States
Map 1
Source: Small Arms Survey 2007.
1. Introduction
The border lands connecting Kenya, Sudan, and Uganda 
form a large portion of the East Africa drylands. The 
pastoral ethnic groups living in this part of the continent—
northern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern 
Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia—share a common 
language, culture, and geographical location. The majority 
of those living in this arid and semi-arid area are pastoral-
ists, whose social and economic life is structured around 
the maintenance and well-being of their livestock. For 
pastoralists, livestock serves as the primary asset and source 
of sustenance (Jacobs 1965; Silberman 1959). Their way of life 
has been dictated by severe weather patterns characterized 
by a climate where temperatures often exceed 40 degrees 
centigrade with little annual rainfall (Mburu 1999). During 
the dry season or times of drought, pastoralists are forced 
to relocate their cattle in search of water and pasturelands 
for grazing. Temporary cattle camps, or “kraals,”1 are as-
sembled to keep livestock from wandering off and to protect 
them from potential raids by neighboring tribes.
Jonah Leff is currently a member of the UN 
Panel of Experts on the Sudan, monitoring and 
reporting on the UN arms embargo in Darfur. 
1 “Kraal” is an African word for a roughly cir-
cular fenced enclosure for cattle or other live-
stock, located within a homestead or village.
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With limited access to water and competing rights to 
land, inter-tribal conflict arises when pastoralists from 
one tribe enter the territory of another. This phenomenon 
occurs among tribes within borders as well as with those 
across the border in neighboring countries. The pastoralist 
conflict has remained low-profile (if visible at all), against 
a backdrop of insurgencies and wars that have afflicted the 
region. Conventional wisdom has underestimated the direct 
and indirect impacts of pastoralist conflict, in many cases 
writing it off as a primitive cultural practice. The spillover 
effects of wars in southern Sudan and Uganda—including 
the proliferation of high-powered assault rifles—have 
transformed otherwise low-intensity tensions into full-scale 
massacres (Mburu 1999). These pastoral clashes go largely 
under-reported.
This report reviews the scale, consequences of, and re-
sponses to the many pastoral conflicts in Sudan, Uganda, 
and Kenya. Inter-tribal clashes frequently erupt among the 
Turkana and Pokot (Kenya), Toposa (Sudan), and Karimo-
jong (Uganda) (see map 2). At one time managed locally 
through customary mechanisms, these conflicts are in-
creasingly fatal. The consequences are far-reaching: ranging 
from widespread fatalities (including women and children), 
protracted displacement of families, and severe depletion 
of livestock. State responses in Uganda, Kenya, and Sudan 
have typically been coercive and repressive, a function of 
comparatively deeply-rooted repressive attitudes toward 
non-sedentary populations. It is vital that international and 
domestic actors recognize the dynamics of these pastoral 
conflicts if arms control and disarmament activities are to 
generate meaningful outcomes for human security. 
Map 2
Source: Small Arms Survey 2007.
2. Methodology
The methodologies employed in this study use multiple 
tools, which were designed to triangulate with one another 
for maximum data reliability. They include the following:
2.1. Key Informant Interviews
Key informant interviews were conducted in Eastern Equa-
toria (Sudan) and in the Lokichoggio and Oropoi divisions 
of northern Kenya. The interview questions were mostly 
open-ended, allowing the respondent to give anecdotal 
evidence to support his/her opinions. Interviews were con-
ducted with a variety of actors, including government and 
military officials, CBO representatives, UN officials, chiefs, 
and elders.
2.2. Retrospective Analysis
Lexis Nexis was used to construct a timeline of news articles 
that describe violent events that have occurred throughout 
the pastoralist region. By accumulating news articles from 
the region, it is possible to gain a nuanced view of violent 
events. In addition, articles were used to map patterns of 
violence as well as community and governmental responses 
to such events. These articles were also used to fact-check the 
information gleaned through key informant interviews.
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3. Pastoral Conflict: An Escalating Problem
Pastoralists make up a considerable proportion of the 
population of the Greater Horn of Africa, and are the 
dominant grouping within the Kenya-Sudan-Uganda 
border region. These pastoralists face a harsh existence 
with cattle rearing, migration, and self-defense form-
ing the basic cornerstones of their livelihoods. Conflicts 
over common resources are instituted features of inter- 
and intra-communal relations. But the influence of past 
wars—including an abundance of high-powered assault 
rifles—has intensified what were once minor clashes. The 
commercialized trade in small arms, controlled in part by 
local elites, has intensified the conflict, leading to wide-
spread indiscriminate fatalities (mostly women and chil-
dren), displacement of families, and depletion of livestock 
(Mkutu 2003; Osamba 2000). A 2008 Small Arms Survey 
study in Eastern Equatoria State (Sudan) and Turkana 
North (Kenya) reveals that nearly half of all respondents 
(45.7 per cent, n=238, N=521) had witnessed a violent event 
in their lifetime (McEvoy and Murray 2008).2 Moreover, 
between 1994 and 2005, pastoralist districts in Uganda 
and Kenya lost an estimated 460,000 livestock, worth over 
US$75 million, and as of 2003, a total of 164,457 people 
had been displaced by conflict in northern Kenya (Pkalya, 
Adan, and Masinde 2003). Similar patterns are prevalent 
among pastoralist communities in neighboring countries.
Violent confrontations involving the Toposa of South-
ern Sudan and Turkana of Northern Kenya are reported 
weekly.3 In 2004, just a few kilometers from Narus, Sudan, 
a group of over one hundred Turkana warriors from 
Kenya crossed the border to attack a Toposa kraal on the 
outskirts of Narus. In the clash, over thirty people were 
reported killed, and more than one hundred cattle, worth 
over US$22,000, were stolen. The government of Southern 
Sudan (GoSS) compensated the families with livestock 
after efforts to settle with the Kenyan authorities failed.4 
Between 2004 and 2008, local peace deals reduced the 
frequency and intensity of tribal raids. In May 2008, how-
ever, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio Division 
of northern Kenya, resulting in an estimated forty-three 
deaths, the majority Taposa (McEvoy and Murray 2008).
Likewise, in May 2007, 54 people were reported killed and 
11 injured when Toposa tribesmen attacked Didinga vil-
lagers while they were cultivating their crops, just outside 
of Kapoeta, Sudan. Among the 54 victims, 48 were women 
and children. Sources claim that this was a well-coor-
dinated attack and involved heavy and general-purpose 
machine guns, RPGs, 60mm mortars, and AKM assault 
rifles. In addition to the killings, the Toposa made away 
with a total of 800 cattle and goats.5 In response, Michael 
Losike Lokeruia, a Toposa member of the Southern Sudan 
Legislative Assembly called for simultaneous disarma-
ment in Eastern Equatoria, but cautioned that such an 
initiative would only be successful if neighboring commu-
nities in Kenya and Uganda were disarmed as well (Sudan 
Tribune, July 23, 2007).
Research conducted in Eastern Equatoria suggests that 
armed violence of this magnitude is commonplace,6 but 
with limited media attention to the region, combined with 
poor communications infrastructure, even large events 
such as this may well go unreported. Clearly, pastoral 
conflict is not limited exclusively to border areas. It is 
common among neighboring tribes within Sudan as well 
as in neighboring countries. Although UNMIS peacekeep-
ers are present in Southern Sudan, their deployment to 
Eastern Equatoria is limited to Torit. Moreover, their man-
date is only to “protect civilians under imminent threat 
of physical violence” in the context of the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement rather than disarming them (UNMIS 
2005). With the near absence of state-led security provid-
ers, most pastoral communities have little-to-no protec-
tion against the threat of violence.
2 A total of 324 questionnaires were admin-
istered in the following counties in Sudan: 
Ikotos, Kapoeta East, Kapoeta North, Kapoeta 
South, Lafon, and Torit. A total of 194 ques-
tionnaires were administered in the following 
divisions in Kenya: Lokichoggio and Oropoi. 
3 Discussions with local leaders in East-
ern Equatoria (Sudan) and Lokichoggio 
Division (Kenya) in May/June 2007.
4 Interview with Albert Locheria, Coordina-
tor of the Kapoeta East Native Development 
Association (KENDA), June 4, 2007.
5 E-mail correspondence with UN-
MIS official, July 13, 2007.
6 Interviews in Sudan May/June 2007.
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4. Factors Contributing to the Conflict 
4.1. Environmental Factors
Unfavorable climatic conditions play a critical role and of-
ten precipitate the need for pastoralists to migrate in search 
of pasturelands and water. During the dry season, sources 
of water become desiccated and lands turn arid. This forces 
young pastoralists to leave villages with their livestock in 
search of water and grazing lands. It is during these times 
that pastoralists engage in conflict over herding territory 
and replenishment of lost cattle. When conditions are made 
worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become 
more intensified and frequent.
In the past few decades, drought-related emergencies have 
risen sharply. Oxfam (2006), for instance, reports that from 
1975 to 2006 the number of people affected by drought rose 
from 16,000 to an estimated three million. This calcula-
tion does not take into account that the population has also 
grown significantly, but not nearly as exponentially as those 
impacted by the recurrent droughts. The Turkana have been 
faced with a persistent drought problem since 1999. They call 
this event “Kichutanak,” which means “it has swept away ev-
erything, even animals.”  In some areas of Turkana District, 
70 percent of people’s livestock were lost. In financial terms, 
this is equivalent to losing 70 percent of one’s savings. Not 
surprisingly, prolonged drought and the cattle deaths associ-
ated with it brought escalating levels of violence in the region.
In March 2006, over 600 Turkana families from Oropoi 
village, Kenya, left their homes and crossed the border into 
Uganda with their livestock in search of water. This became 
their only option when the sole water pump within a radius 
of 50 km dried up (Africa News, March 28, 2006). Inevi-
tably, the neighboring Dodoth tribe in northern Uganda 
attacked the fleeing Turkana.
In the past, pastoralists had strategies for coping with the 
impacts of drought. However, more severe weather pat-
terns resulting from climate change, coupled with colonial 
and post-colonial policies that constrain the movement of 
pastoralists, makes inter- and intra-tribal rivalries more 
commonplace.
4.2. Colonial and Post-Colonial Policies
Cattle raiding among pastoralists is a phenomenon that 
stretches back centuries. Traditionally, cattle rustling, 
often involving some violence, was redistributive and only 
involved the theft of cattle to replenish herds after death 
from drought or to pay out as bride price.  When tribe 
members were killed, cattle were offered as compensation 
and the culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. 
Prior to the system of hierarchical government, councils of 
elders, traditional courts, and peer groups were at the center 
of authority among tribes. As such, they governed raids 
to ensure that they did not spiral out of control, and when 
disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to 
settle them (Mkutu 2003). Typically, there was some loss of 
life from raiding, but on a much smaller scale.
Colonial rulers disrupted the pastoralist social order, replac-
ing it with a system of provincial government appointees 
within newly established borders that limited the free 
movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to 
families was passed down from one generation to the next, 
but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with 
discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom (Kandagor 
2005). In addition, pastoral communities were isolated from 
other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and 
development (Mburu 1999). The apparent crackdown on 
cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoral-
ism itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus in-
humane way of life. The weakening of traditional governance 
has undermined pastoralists’ authority and ability to settle 
disputes. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional 
structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in 
an anarchic environment (Mkutu 2003).
7 http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/is-
sues/climate_change/story_turkana.htm.
8 It is pastoralist tradition for the groom to present 
a number of animals to the family of the bride. The 
number of livestock given to the bride’s family de-
pends on the economic status of the groom’s family. 
Wealthy families give dowries of up to 300 animals 
worth roughly US$25,000. Many young warriors will 
raid cattle camps in order to provide large numbers 
of cattle to their bride. As cattle has increasingly 
become a commercial commodity, brides and 
their families have begun to put large demands 
on bride-price. Information from interviews with 
chiefs from Lokichoggio, Kenya, on June 1, 2007
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Today, with a colonial attitude that has persisted in the 
post-colonial era,9 the spread of land privatization, and 
government policies favoring sedentary groups and large-
scale agriculture over nomadic livelihoods, competition over 
grazing areas has grown increasingly fierce. Pastoralists are 
also heavily underrepresented in parliament and civil service 
posts. Furthermore, Duffield argues that neo-liberal policies 
that embrace a market economy polarize rich and poor, 
resulting in a new generation of youth that disregard the au-
thority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia forma-
tion and banditry (1997). Local business and political elites 
use cattle rustling as a means for commercial profit, capital-
izing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.
4.3. Commercialization of Cattle Raiding
The emergence of local elites that aim to profit from cattle 
rustling is a fairly new phenomenon that has changed the 
scope of the conflict by creating economic incentives that 
did not previously exist. This has exacerbated the brutality 
associated with raiding and has created links between the 
illicit trades in stolen cattle and small arms. Mkutu writes 
that commercialization in cattle rustling is “leading to ma-
jor changes in economic, social and political structures in 
the border area” (2003). Local businessmen and even politi-
cians reportedly fund raids in order to sell cattle on the 
black market to places as far away as South Africa and Saudi 
Arabia (Mkutu 2003). Stolen cattle are also used to sup-
ply large towns, which have grown in population through 
rural-to-urban migration. Whereas small-scale raiding does 
not deplete entire stocks, commercialized raids with elabo-
rate planning and logistical know-how can render entire 
communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and Lind (2005) 
suggest that there are typically five large raids in Southern 
Turkana in a given year. Large infrequent raids, coupled 
with repeated small-scale incidents create an environment 
of insecurity and financial hardship.
The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastat-
ing effects on the pastoralist economy. Whereas cattle 
traditionally circulated within the pastoralist region, they 
are now being sold outside without any revenue to speak of. 
In many instances, warriors conducting large commercial 
raids outnumber security forces. There is also evidence 
that many local security providers are in collusion with the 
profiteers of raids (Mkutu 2003). The lack of state control 
in the pastoralist region has made way for, what Osamba 
calls “the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia” 
(2000). Without proper security provision, a small number 
of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a 
great number of people.
4.4. Lack of State Security Provision
As part of a political campaign that favors sedentary 
communities over non-sedentary groups, governments 
have neglected to invest a great deal in infrastructure and 
public services in the pastoralist border areas, thus exac-
erbating the lack of state security in the region. Without 
sufficient roads, accessible lines of communication, and a 
large qualified security presence, pastoralists have had no 
choice but to take up arms in order to protect their families 
and livestock. Moreover, cross-border raiders are immune 
from prosecution, because governments lack the capacity or 
infrastructure required to prosecute those involved in acts 
taking place in other jurisdictions.10 The Small Arms Survey 
reports that nearly 60 percent of residents living along the 
Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied with security provi-
sions in their communities (McEvoy and Murray 2008).
In Kenya and Uganda, where the military’s role is restricted 
to responding to large-scale incidents and carrying out 
community disarmament programs, governments have 
armed local defense units to provide security at the local 
level. These comprise civilians who are given a registered 
firearm and ammunition without any training or remu-
neration. In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reserv-
ists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-pattern and G3 assault 
rifles, function as a community task force mandated to 
respond to local crime and disputes. While the KPR are 
9 The policies, first implemented during the 
colonial era, that viewed nomadic culture as 
backward and primitive have persisted. The 
Kenyan government has continued to marginal-
ize pastoralist communities by limiting their 
rights to land and through under-representa-
tion in government (Mkutu 2003, 2006).
10  Confidential interviews conduct-
ed in Sudan in May/June 2007.
194IJCV : Vol. 3 (2) 2009, pp. 188 – 203Jonah Leff: Pastoralists at War
sometimes effective in defending communities against 
cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons 
to warriors for raiding purposes, undermining the very 
security they are supposed to protect.  Moreover, a 2008 
ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of il-
licit civilian-held ammunition was Kenyan-manufactured, 
revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded 
stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials (Bevan 2008a).
The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South-
ern Sudan has also been accused of corruption and poor 
response to violent incidents. There is a growing police force 
in Southern Sudan, but it lacks training, is poorly funded, 
and due to insufficient transportation and communications, 
cannot respond in time to violent events.12 Between the 
border town of Nadapal (Sudan) and Lokichoggio (Kenya), 
a disputed 25-kilometer road connects the two countries. 
Without any security posts on the road, Turkana warriors 
from the hills are able to ambush the many cars that travel 
up and down this road daily. The SPLA Commander of 
Nadapal confirmed that banditry on the border road results 
in fatalities on a weekly basis.13
Deficits in the government security sector are compounded 
by the common practice of governments and security forces 
arming paramilitary groups for political advantage against 
opponents, notably in Uganda and Sudan. This, among 
other things, sustains the circulation and widespread avail-
ability of small arms.
4.5. Proliferation of Small Arms
Pastoralists living in the border region provide a large 
market for small arms. Traditionally, pastoralists practiced 
cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today, with the 
availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault 
rifles, namely the AK-47, the conflict has taken on epidemic 
proportions with increased fatalities and indiscriminate 
killing during raids. A 2008 study in Karamoja, Uganda, 
found that 88 percent of respondents recalled a small arm 
being used in the last violent attack on their community 
(see figure 1) (Bevan 2008b). Likewise, the Small Arms 
Survey suggests that small arms are used in 96.9 per cent 
of cattle rustling events in the Kenya-Sudan border region 
(McEvoy and Murray 2008). While it is difficult to estimate 
the exact number of small arms in circulation in the region, 
experts estimate that it is well over 300,000 (Regional 
Program of Action for Peace and Security 2006). Pastoralist 
communities arm themselves for several reasons. First, they 
need to protect their family and livestock from warriors of 
other tribes and bandits. Second, guns are used to raid live-
stock from other communities. Lastly, guns are an invest-
ment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial 
goods.14
Small arms have been present throughout the region since 
the early twentieth century. However, past wars in Uganda, 
Sudan, and Ethiopia left a surplus of weapons in circulation. 
One event, in particular, that is often recalled is the 1979 
raid on the Moroto arms depot in Uganda, following the 
collapse of the Idi Amin regime. The Matheniko Karimo-
jong sub-clan were successful in acquiring large quantities 
of weapons and ammunition during the raid (Mkutu 2007). 
A similar event took place in Kapoeta, Southern Sudan, in 
2002, during the North-South war. After the SPLA captured 
Kapoeta, which at the time was a military stronghold of the 
north, security at arms stores was lax or non-existent, and 
as a result, Taposa tribesmen (who live around Kapoeta) 
were able to seize thousands of weapons (Bevan 2008a).15
Compounding the situation, the SPLA laid off several hun-
dred troops after the war, offering them small arms as part 
of their retirement package. Not surprisingly, many of the 
officers sold them to gun markets in Sudan, Uganda, and 
Kenya (Mkutu 2006).
Furthermore, it is widely believed that the government of 
Sudan in Khartoum provides arms to pastoralist communi-
ties in the South in order to destabilize the government of 
Southern Sudan’s power base, and to challenge the authority 
of the SPLA.16 These weapons inevitably leak out of commu-
nities into the greater arms trade routes of the region. Events 
11 Confidential interview with a knowledge-
able source, Lokichoggio, Kenya, June 1, 2007.
12 Interviews with SPLA Commander of Na-
dapal, Sudan, June 4, 2007, and Alphonse 
Irenge, Senior Inspector Local Govern-
ment, Narus, Sudan, June 5, 2007.
13 Interview with SPLA Commander 
of Nadapal, Sudan, June 4, 2007.
14 Interviews in Kenya and Sudan in May/June 2007.
15 Confidential interviews  conducted 
in Sudan in May/June 2007.
16 Interview with Marko Lokorae, Commissioner 
of Kapoeta East County, Sudan, June 5, 2007.
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of this magnitude along with smaller raids of insecure 
stockpiles and sales from corrupt officials have contributed 
remarkably to the proliferation of small arms in the region.
Map 3: Cross-Border Arms Flows
Source: Mkutu 2003.
Mkutu reports there are four main trade routes for small arms 
in the border region (2006, see map 3). The primary route, he 
believes, is from Southern Sudan to the Karamoja region of 
Uganda. From Kotido district arms are trafficked into Pokot 
and Samburu districts of Kenya. Others are taken south to Mo-
roto and Nakapiripirit districts in Uganda. The second is the 
“north-eastern route” into Kenya from Somalia. From Somalia, 
these arms move through the Merille area of Ethiopia and on 
to the Karamoja region in Uganda. From there, they move east 
into the Pokot and Turkana areas of Kenya. Due to the many 
areas of transit, this route is very costly. It is also believed that 
arms come in from Somalia from the south, but according to 
the local Turkana, most of these weapons are dropped off to 
Somali arms dealers to be sold in Nairobi, Kenya.17 The third 
route flows from Southern Sudan into Lokichoggio, Kenya. 
It is estimated that roughly 11,000 guns per year make their 
way over the border along this trade route (IGAD 2004). The 
Turkana take some of these arms into Uganda for resale. The 
fourth route is the Karenga-Lopoch-Kotido direction. This is 
the primary route for providing the sub-clans of the Kari-
mojong with weapons. The Jie tribe is said to be the principle 
supplier of small arms to other groups of the Karimojong, and 
possibly the Turkana in Kenya (Mkutu 2006).
Over the past few decades, the price of small arms has 
dropped dramatically. During the 1990s, an AK-47 cost 
between 20 and 30 cows (US$3,000–3,500) (Mkutu 2006). 
Today, an AK-47 sells for as little as three cows (US$300–
350). Conversely, ammunition, which used to be sold by the 
bucket, has increased in price.  This leaves one to wonder 
why the price of small arms has not increased following 
the many aggressive state-led disarmament initiatives. The 
decrease in weapons after disarmament should have caused 
a price rise unless demand also decreased. Due to the 
resistance and conflict that has resulted from disarmament 
programs in the region, it is quite unlikely that this phe-
nomenon can be explained by a decrease in demand. One 
reasonable explanation is that the excess in weapons carried 
into the region by military forces has contributed to the 
overall number in circulation. Soldiers who are dissatisfied 
or looking for extra cash may sell the weapons they collect 
back into the civilian population. This type of corruption 
among security providers undermines the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of disarmament campaigns.
5. Implications of Disarmament
The internationally prescribed and favored course of action 
for governments in response to conflict of this nature has 
been civilian disarmament programs. Particularly in the 
Horn of Africa, where pastoralists have been marginalized 
and perceived as continuing a historical conflict based on 
backward customs and ideals, governments have imple-
mented heavy-handed coercive disarmament programs.19 
Such crackdown operations often intensify insecurity for 
disarmed groups, in some cases prompting raids from 
neighboring tribes who seek to take advantage of their 
neighbors’ temporary weakness. 
17 Confidential interviews conduct-
ed in Kenya in May/June 2007.
18 Interviews with local leaders in Ke-
nya and Sudan in May/June 2007.
19 Coercive disarmament is often pursued 
as part of crime reduction, peacekeeping, or  
peace support operations. It is usually  
conducted exclusively by security  structures,  
and carries the threat of punitive 
 measures for non-compliance.
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5.1. Disarmament in Karamoja, Uganda
Uganda has long experimented with coercive disarmament of 
its pastoral populations, particularly in the Karamoja region. 
At least eight disarmament campaigns have been undertaken 
since 1945. More recent campaigns in 2001 and 2002 led to 
the recovery of at least 10,000 weapons, though many (8,000) 
were subsequently re-issued to warriors who were recruited 
into Local Defense Units and Anti-Stock-Theft coalitions 
(Uganda 2005). By 2006, many of the latter were considered 
obsolete, with a great deal of their weapons and ammunition 
in circulation. Beginning in April 2006, the Uganda People’s 
Defense Force (UPDF) launched aggressive “cordon and 
search” disarmament interventions. Preliminary assessments 
suggest that these activities generated widespread distrust 
and fear among the local population and a concomitant 
increase in demand for weapons (Bevan 2008b).
The UPDF adopted a heavy-handed approach to disarma-
ment in 2006 and 2007. Forces used mounted machine 
guns, assault rifles, and grenades against civilians during 
offensives in the Karamoja region. The casualties included 
many (unarmed) women and children. Predictably, anti-
government/UPDF sentiments flared amongst the Karimo-
jong, resulting in a number of reprisal attacks. For example, 
in mid-October 2006 during retaliation against cordon and 
search operations launched near Kotido town, Jie warriors 
shot dead 16 soldiers including the commanding officer of 
the UPDF 67th battalion (Bevan 2008b). Moreover, UPDF-
initiated disarmament campaigns leave Karamoja commu-
nities vulnerable to raids from tribal groups in other areas 
of Uganda, Kenya and Sudan. Unable to defend themselves, 
the Karimojong are rapidly rearming.
5.2. Disarmament in the North Rift Region of Kenya
The government of Kenya also launched a series of military-
led disarmament programs in seven districts of the North 
Rift region in mid-2006. The process proceeded in three 
phases: (1) Operation Dumisha Amani (maintain peace), 
a voluntary weapons collection that promised increased 
security and amnesty from prosecution, where no force was 
used; (2) Operation Okota I (collect 1), a forceful disarma-
ment of communities that had not cooperated with phase 
one of the program; and (3) Okota II (collect 2), a develop-
ment component designed to improve economic conditions 
in previously armed areas so as to reduce incentives for 
arms possession (Riam Riam 2007).
The disarmament campaign returned approximately 1,710 
firearms and 5,700 rounds of ammunition from Turkana 
District. Disarmament, however, came at a price, espe-
cially for those in Turkana South, where neighboring tribes 
repeatedly attacked disarmed communities (Riam Riam 
2007). During the exercise, the Pokot of Turkana South 
were able to flee into Uganda to avoid having their weapons 
confiscated. The Turkana, on the other hand, were unable to 
relocate, which left them exposed to returning Pokot war-
riors from Uganda. Allegations also surfaced that a number 
of Kenyan military personnel tortured and abused civilians 
when they refused to voluntarily surrender their weapons 
or divulge information concerning armed community 
members.20
Although well intentioned, the program lacked clear 
objectives and genuine consent from community leaders 
and populations. The campaign was rushed and failed to 
sensitize participants. Furthermore, civilian populations 
rapidly lost confidence when they discovered that they were 
not going to be compensated for their surrendered weapons. 
Pastoral populations, long used to repressive interventions 
from the state, interpreted the disarmament process as 
yet another offensive intended to undermine their overall 
development and freedom of movement.
When the news from Turkana South reached Turkana 
North, chiefs and community leaders requested that the 
government conduct disarmament on a voluntary basis. As 
an alternative to giving up their arms, weapon holders were 
recruited as KPR, exchanging their weapons for registered 
government-issued ones.21 This unorthodox approach to 
20 Phone interview with Alex Losikiria, 
Coordinator of APEDI, July 3, 2007, and 
phone interview with John Mark Edaan, Co-
ordinator of Riam Riam, July 5, 2007. 
21 Phone interview with Alex Losikiria, 
Coordinator of APEDI, July 3, 2007.
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disarmament maintained security without damaging civil-
ian and military relations. This method, however, does not 
address the negative implications of arming untrained and 
unpaid civilians, as discussed above.
22 Members of the White Army are dispersed 
throughout several communities, and act as 
defense forces at the local level, but some-
times team up for particular causes.
23 There is suspicion, however, that many 
of these armed youth that had fled dur-
ing the dry season have returned to vil-
lages with the start of the wet season.
24 E-mail correspondence with UN-
MIS official, July 13, 2007.
Disarmament Gone Wrong in Jonglei State, Sudan
South Sudan has also experienced disarmament with mixed 
results. Between December 2005 and May 2006, the SPLA 
conducted a disarmament campaign in northern Jonglei 
State, Sudan. This initiative faced resistance from the Lou 
Nuer faction of the White Army (a loosely organized col-
lection of armed young men that received arms from the 
Khartoum government in the north, and from local tribes 
in the area).22 In terms of weapons collected, the northern 
Jonglei disarmament initiative was a success, with estimates 
of weapons collected ranging between 3,300 and 3,701. 
However, the human costs associated with this program 
were remarkably high. By the time it was over, the cam-
paign resulted in an estimated 1,200 White Army and 400 
SPLA soldier deaths—approximately one death for every 
two weapons seized. Officials reported over 213 civilian 
deaths as well as looting and burning of houses in roughly 
15 villages suspected of hosting cadres of resistance (Small 
Arms Survey 2006). The Jonglei exercise, ad hoc in nature, 
was poorly planned and lacked buy-in from local chiefs 
and community members. Disguised as civilian disarma-
ment, the operation was politically motivated and aimed at 
crushing dissent. Finally, in February 2007, in response to 
previously failed efforts, the GoSS produced principles and 
guidelines for future initiatives (GoSS 2007). However, de-
spite these developments, there is no institution mandated 
to oversee civilian disarmament in South Sudan.
Although disarmament was not fully realized, the perception 
among White Army members was that they were weakened, 
in an insecure environment, with fewer guns to protect their 
villages. While many subsequently joined the SPLA, those 
who chose not to found themselves living in fear of attack 
by rival Murle and Dinka tribesmen who remained armed.
Although the SPLA promised buffer zones to protect dis-
armed communities, these never materialized. Following the 
campaign, it has become extremely difficult to purchase guns 
due to the harsh punishment attached to arms sales and pos-
session. While this may, at first glance, appear to be a positive 
byproduct of the disarmament program, it ultimately under-
mined the ability of villagers to guard against the threat of 
raids from neighboring tribes (Garfield 2007).
A range of disarmament efforts continue in Jonglei State. 
A UN-backed campaign in Akobo yielded an estimated 
1,400 rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and 
mortars from Murle militia by July 2006. Most recently, 
UNMIS supported a voluntary disarmament campaign in 
Pibor County, targeting the Murle tribe, which ended in 
May 2007. Approximately 1,126 weapons and 79 rounds of 
ammunition were collected.  The surprisingly small amount 
of ammunition collected raises the possibility that civil-
ians remain in possession of arms for which they require 
ammunition. Disarmament efforts were later expanded to 
Boma, an isolated region of Pibor County, but temporarily 
postponed owing to the onset of the rainy season and the 
lack of security provision by the SPLA.24
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The poorly planned coercive measures applied in Jonglei, 
Karamoja, and Turkana are indicative of the neglectful 
attitude of governments toward the pastoralist regions. It 
is clear from these cases that disarmament schemes that 
ignore the root causes of demand for small arms, while 
simultaneously putting communities on the defensive 
without proper state-led security provision may result in 
an array of unintended consequences. A 2008 Small Arms 
Survey report from the Sudan-Kenya border region reports 
that more than 60 percent of respondents believe that civil-
ian disarmament would decrease security in their villages 
(McEvoy and Murray 2008). When locals were asked how 
disarmament in Jonglei and Turkana South affected the 
security of those areas, the majority of respondents claimed 
that it had decreased security. Not surprisingly, when asked 
how a potential disarmament program in the community 
would change the level of security, most said it would de-
crease security a lot. 
Whereas civilian disarmament has yielded mixed results, a 
number of local conflict resolution initiatives have brought 
some hope to the situation.
6. Alternative Conflict Resolution Mechanisms
The effectiveness of coercive disarmament is open to dis-
pute. Few evidence-based studies have been undertaken to 
assess the extent to which such interventions yield compar-
atively high weapons returns or meaningful improvements 
in safety and security. There is, however, a growing body 
of evidence demonstrating that more modest initiatives 
advanced by credible civil society organizations (CSO) are 
delivering encouraging returns with fewer human costs. 
A number of CSOs are currently conducting cross-border 
conflict prevention and mediation interventions aimed at im-
proving communication through peacebuilding workshops 
and negotiating the safe return of cattle. These CSOs attempt 
to reinstate and utilize traditional lines of authority that have 
been weakened since the colonial era.26 In other words, vil-
lage elders, who once oversaw the practice of raiding, play a 
central role, and are given authority throughout the mitiga-
tion process. These initiatives, coupled with a more robust 
and better-trained state security presence may be the catalyst 
necessary for successful voluntary disarmament.27
6.1 Dodoth-Turkana Cross-Border Conflict Mitigation Initiative
USAID, through its contracted agent (Development Alter-
natives, Inc.) and local partners (Riam Riam in Kenya and 
Kotido Peace Initiative (KOPEIN) in Uganda) funded a 
project in response to skirmishes involving Dodoth (Ugan-
da) and Turkana (Kenya) that had taken place in March 
2004. There had been expectations on the ground that a 
reprisal attack was set to take place in early 2005. That such 
an attack did not occur was attributed to the cross-border 
peace process implemented by Development Alternatives, 
Inc., and its partners.
Outputs of the project include:
•  The Provisional Peace Agreement between Dodoth and 
Turkana tribal leaderships in December 2005. This is an 
all-inclusive accord that most importantly involved the 
participation of youth.
•  Peaceful sharing of resources on both sides of the border.
•  Negotiated return by the Dodoth of an abducted 14-year 
old Turkana boy to his family.
•  A cross-border conflict prevention, mitigation, and re-
sponse network of local organizations with mechanisms 
for sharing natural resources between communities.
•  Cultural transformation from “readiness to raid and 
revenge” to “report [to local authorities] and wait for ac-
tion.”
•  Partnership with government strengthened. Both the 
Kenyan and Ugandan governments have begun working 
more closely with civil society in resolving cross-border 
disputes.
• Sustainable culture of peace and sharing in the region.
25 Interviews in Kenya and Sudan in May/June 2007.
26 The status and decision-making power of 
elders have been stripped by business elites and 
wealthy warriors that benefit from large-scale theft 
and excessively violent forms of cattle raiding.
27 In discussions with government officials in 
Eastern Equatoria and northern Kenya, many 
called for an increase in properly trained security 
personnel. Until that is accomplished, civilians will 
not have an incentive to give up their arms, which in 
many cases serve as people’s only form of defense.
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Within the framework of the USAID-funded conflict pre-
vention, mitigation, and response strategy, the Peace in East 
and Central Africa (PEACE) program run by Development 
Alternatives, Inc., currently lends support to a host of local 
NGOs, CSOs, and CBOs that operate at the district level on 
either side of the border. Currently, there are a total of five 
cross-border conflict mitigation initiatives, like the Dodoth-
Turkana project, currently under way in Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Somalia, and Uganda (USAID 2006).
As a result of the project, the two local partner CSOs, Riam 
Riam and KOPEIN, have built their capacity and continue 
conflict mitigation and peacebuilding in the border region. 
Riam Riam was brought into the disarmament process by 
the Kenyan government, and has acted as an intermediary 
between communities, government, and military leaders. 
Their objective is to represent the interests and security 
needs of pastoralists in order to avoid a replay of the events 
experienced in Turkana South. Similarly, KOPEIN conducts 
public awareness campaigns and sensitization workshops 
and works in close collaboration with the Ugandan po-
lice, UPDF, Ugandan Human Rights Commission, local 
government and community leaders, and NGOs (Oxfam 
and SNV) to promote dialogue and reconciliation between 
tribes in Karamoja, Uganda, and neighboring tribes in 
Kenya and Sudan.
This multi-layered initiative has inspired a culture of trust 
and respect for local conflict response mechanisms. Fur-
thermore, through improved communication, pastoralists 
can resolve differences with rival tribes, and are also less 
likely to carry out raids knowing that there are systematic 
mechanisms for responding to such hostilities.
Likewise, the Adakar Peace and Development Initiatives 
(APEDI) were created to promote peace and security in 
the Turkana and Toposa regions of Kenya and Southern 
Sudan. When Operation Lifeline Sudan, which provided 
humanitarian assistance to Southern Sudan during the 
North-South conflict, was terminated, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, whose base was located in 
Lokichoggio, donated its fixed assets to local CSOs and gov-
ernment and selected APEDI as the chief recipient. APEDI 
conducts its peace-building by addressing people’s griev-
ances at the local level and by targeting the kraals (adakar 
in the Turkana language) for dialogue and strategies of 
conflict resolution. Utilizing a combination of traditional 
and modern structures of authority, APEDI brokers peace 
settlements between clashing tribes before initial raids and 
attacks escalate into protracted armed violence. Typically, 
APEDI, with the backing of local government, elders, and 
chiefs, responds to raids by contacting the local government 
and CSOs in Narus, just over the border in Sudan.28 The 
leaders from both communities negotiate for the safe return 
of cattle and compensation for lives lost.
28 The Toposa Development Association (TDA) 
and the Kapoeta East Native Development As-
sociation (KENDA) are conducting similar conflict 
mitigation programs in Eastern Equatoria, Sudan.
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Contrary to disarmament initiatives in the region that ap-
ply top-down blanket solutions to complex sets of circum-
stances, local initiatives that embrace both customary and 
current practices of governance are producing results. The 
emergence of CSO response mechanisms provides a poten-
tial deterrence effect for identifying communities whose 
members have engaged in raiding. Although these local 
organizations have brought rewards to the region, in most 
cases they lack the capacity and budget to produce results 
large enough to grab the attention of the international and 
donor community.
7. Regional Initiatives
In response to the vast failings of coercive disarmament, 
multilateral and bilateral agencies are exploring alternative 
approaches to mitigating pastoral conflicts. Regional bodies, 
host governments and donors are becoming increasingly 
more aware of the spillover effects of the pastoralist conflict. 
Consequently, peacebuilding initiatives are gaining more at-
tention and resources from governments than in the past. 
Due to the cross-border challenges presented by warring 
groups, certain countries in the Horn of Africa formed the 
Nairobi Secretariat, which later became the Regional Center 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA).30 RECSA was 
expected to enhance the capacity of states to meet the com-
mitments enshrined in the Nairobi Protocol.31 RECSA also 
acts as a forum for cooperation among National Focal Points 
and other relevant agencies to prevent, combat, and eradi-
cate stockpiling and illicit trafficking in small arms and light 
weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.
In a parallel initiative, the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs 
Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO) works closely with 
government and CSOs to develop, strengthen and enforce 
legislation aimed at reducing cattle rustling and associated 
armed violence. In 2005, EAPCCO introduced the Protocol 
on the Prevention, Combating, and Eradication of Cattle 
Rustling in Eastern Africa.32 Eleven East African countries 
signed the protocol in August 2008 (EAPCCO 2008).33
Finally, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) established the Conflict Early Warning and Re-
sponse Mechanism (CEWARN) in 2002 in order to enhance 
awareness of pastoral conflicts in Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Uganda. With field monitors reporting from each of the 
29 Phone interview with Alex Losikiria, 
Coordinator of APEDI, July 3, 2007.
30 RECSA has twelve members, namely Bu-
rundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.
31 The Nairobi Protocol (2004) sets minimum 
standards to govern the manufacture, posses-
sion, marking, import, export, transit, transfer, 
and stockpiling of small arms and light weapons. 
It also outlines provisions regarding disarma-
ment, security providers, and awareness-raising.
32 The objectives of the Protocol are to: “1) Prevent, 
combat and eradicate cattle rustling and related 
criminal activities in the Eastern Africa region; 
2) Systematically and comprehensively address 
cattle rustling in the region in order to ensure that 
its negative social and economic consequences 
are eradicated and that peoples’ livelihoods are 
secured; 3) Enhance regional co-operation, joint 
operations, capacity-building and exchange 
of information and; 4) Promote peace, human 
security and development in the region.”
33 Signatories include Republic of Burundi, 
Republic of Djibouti, State of Eritrea, Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Republic of Ke-
nya, Republic of Rwanda, Republic of Seychelles, 
Republic of Somalia, Republic of Sudan, United 
Republic of Tanzania, and Republic of Uganda.
Following an attack that claimed the lives of two prominent 
Turkana warriors and resulted in the theft of their rifles and 
215 goats and sheep, APEDI mobilized its first intervention in 
February 2005. Joined by Turkana chiefs, elders, and a peace 
committee comprised of local leaders, APEDI paid a visit 
to Toposa chiefs and elders in Sudan. During this meeting, 
they negotiated the safe return of the two rifles and livestock 
and designed the framework for a sensitization campaign for 
peace that would employ traditional lines of authority in their 
respective communities. This intervention brought about an 
eighteen-month cease-fire that, for the first time in years, al-
lowed Turkana and Toposa to safely walk with their livestock 
across the border. However, the cease-fire came to an abrupt 
end in January 2007 following an attack by Toposa raiders 
almost 50 kilometers outside Lokichoggio. APEDI neverthe-
less responded with cross-border negotiations and continues 
to play an instrumental role in the settlement of small-scale 
subsequent reprisals by both sides.29
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countries, CEWARN is able to track and report on violent 
incidents in order to equip governments with knowledge 
regarding trends on and factors behind pastoral violence. 
The recent growth in regional initiatives lends credence to 
the idea that the pastoralist conflict has become an issue 
worth addressing. Governments, in cooperation with CSOs, 
have brought greater attention to the issue and created a 
regional legislative framework. Nevertheless, despite these 
encouraging developments, states still have a predisposi-
tion to disarm communities, often coercively. This has not 
only resulted in outbreaks of violence but, in many cases, 
increased demand for weapons.
8. Recommendations 
8.1. Improved Security and Peacebuilding
•  Governments need to install adequate law enforcement in 
the pastoralist regions. They need to offer sizeable incen-
tives so that security forces will not resort to corruption 
as a way of supplementing their income. Security posts 
should be positioned on borders and at violence hotspots 
where tribes are known to clash.
•  Governments and international organizations should 
support and build the capacity of local CSOs that are 
working locally to mitigate conflict and sensitize com-
munities with workshops and peacebuilding campaigns. 
This includes, but is not limited to, supplying vehicles and 
CB radios so that CSOs can effectively contact authorities 
for early response.
•  A regional body of CSOs should be formed to enable lo-
cal organizations to share knowledge, form partnerships, 
and work cooperatively toward peace.
•  Build feeder roads connecting main roads to small vil-
lages so that authorities can quickly reach affected areas. 
Knowing that security providers have access to villages 
and kraals would act as a deterrent to raiding warriors. 
Improved road transport would also enable pastoralists 
to partake in local commerce.
8.2. Sustainable Development
•  Governments and donors must continue to build water 
wells so that villages can sustain their livestock during 
the dry season. This would also reduce the amount of 
time women and girls spend fetching water from pumps 
that are sometimes hours away by foot. 
•  Establish cooperatives and inter-tribal commerce of local 
goods and livestock in order to build partnerships and 
economic development through trade. This would, in the 
long-term, undermine the illicit commercial practices of 
livestock traders in the area.
•  Plant Napier grass in grazing areas. Napier grass grows 
very quickly and is tolerant of drought conditions.
8.3 Disarmament
•  Once proper security provisions have been established, 
traditional disarmament practices should be reformed. 
Coordinated voluntary disarmament programs should be 
implemented that disarm neighboring tribes simultane-
ously. 
•  For those surrendering weapons, some kind of compen-
sation should be offered. In order to avoid solely reward-
ing those with weapons, “weapons for development” 
programs should be implemented. Whole villages are re-
warded with improved infrastructure and social services 
after a certain number of weapons have been collected.
•  Communities must be sensitized to and informed about 
disarmament exercises before they commence. Further-
more, community members should play an active role in 
the disarmament process to give them ownership over 
the security of their communities.  
•  Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration cam-
paigns must be introduced for paramilitary groups in 
Sudan and Uganda. Particular attention should be given 
to the reintegration phase that trains ex-combatants for 
employment, so that they do not return to a life of vio-
lence.
•  The Kenya/Uganda Joint Security Program that was es-
tablished in 2005, but has yet to be implemented, should 
begin operations as outlined in its program of action:
 •  Simultaneous and coordinated disarmament opera-
tions
 •  Mobilization, sensitization, and deployment
 •  Establishment of law and order in areas of operation
 •  Branding of livestock
 •  Provision and reconstruction of social and physical 
infrastructure
 •  Rewards and recognition
 •  Support the development of alternative livelihoods
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9. Conclusion
The factors contributing to the pastoralist conflict are 
multidimensional, and have ramifications that affect liveli-
hoods within and across borders. Governments have failed 
to invest sufficient human and financial capital in abating 
the conflict and the underlying underdevelopment in the 
pastoral regions. Responding to this conflict with uncoor-
dinated top-down “disarmament for disarmament’s sake” 
initiatives clearly mask the root causes, and in a number of 
cases destabilizes communities. Given the poor disarma-
ment record of governments and the fact that they lack 
the capacity to conduct simultaneous cross-border disar-
mament programs, disarmament does not appear to be a 
palatable option until there has been a full overhaul of the 
security sector supported by policies to address the demand 
for small arms. 
The efforts of local conflict mitigation organizations have 
proved to be an effective alternative to the recent desta-
bilizing disarmament initiatives. As a result, a culture of 
pastoralism is emerging that relies more heavily on local 
instruments of conflict response, and their respective con-
sequences, as opposed to confidence-eroding disarmament 
programs that prematurely disarm insecure communities. 
When communities no longer face threats from neighbor-
ing tribes and inadequate security providers, weapons will 
lose their utility and worth and voluntary disarmament will 
be an appropriate answer to the small arms dilemma in this 
pastoralist region.
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